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PREME COURT CREATES A BRIDGE BETWEEN

LENT "OUTSIDER TRADING"-Dirks

mission, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
The federal securities laws structure the relationship between
issuers of securities and the public. ' These laws, passed by Congress in
1933 and 1934,2 mandate full and fair disclosure of all relevant investment information 3 in order to assist investors in making informed
investment decisions. In fact, in section 10b of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) , 4 Congress set forth general sanctions for
fraudulent conduct in.securities transactions. In 1942, pursuant to its
authority under section 10b, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC or Commission) enacted rule lOb-5, making it unlawful for any
person to commit or perpetuate any affirmative act of fraud in the
5
purchase or sale of any security.

H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). It has been recognized that, in the
wake of the stock market crash of 1929, such reform was necessary to prevent a recurrence of the
crash and to reinstate investor confidence in securities transactions. See generally 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (compiled by
J.S. Ellenberger & E.P. Mahar 1973).
1 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
3 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 f, g, 781 (1982) (registration requirements for new securities);
id. § 78g (registration and report requirements for corporations); id. § 78o (regulation of
activities of broker-dealers); and id. § 78f (regulation of exchanges and over-the-counter markets).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b))
authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations in furtherance of the purpose thereof. It states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of any national
securities exchange, . . .
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1983). The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
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With no further guidance from Congress, the courts and the SEC
have had to delineate the parameters of rule 10b-5, and to determine
what constitutes actionable conduct within the scope of that rule. As
rule 10b-5 is the only rule promulgated pursuant to the 1934 Act
which prescribes sanctions for fraudulent conduct in securities transactions, early interpretations of the rule were expansive, indicating a
broad-based approach to the protection of investors. 6 In order to
prevent unfair advantages to parties on one side of a securities transaction, the rule was interpreted by the SEC as imposing an affirmative
duty on persons with access to material inside information. Specifically, the rule was read to require such persons to either disclose that
information or to refrain from trading on the basis of what they
knew. 7 In 1980, however, the United States Supreme Court, in
Chiarellav. United States, 8 restricted the scope of liability under the
rule by imposing an affirmative duty to disclose or abstain from
trading only on those persons standing in a fiduciary relationship to
those with whom they trade.9 By basing the duty to disclose (or
abstain from using undisclosed information) on the fiduciary relation-

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
id.
6 See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
7 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). The rule compels disclosure
only of "material" "inside" information. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). The test for determining whether the
information is "material" is whether "there is a reasonable, substantial likelihood that a shareholder would consider it important .. " TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976); see also In re Investors Management Co., Inc. 44 S.E.C. 633, 642 (1971) (factors to
be considered in determining whether information is material include "degree of specificity, the
extent to which it differs from information previously publically disseminated, and its reliability
in light of its nature and source and the circumstances under which it was received."). "Inside"
information has been defined as nonpublic facts relating to the issuer's business or which are
intended only for a corporate purpose. Barry, The Economics o1 Outside Information and Rule
10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (1981). Inside information has been distinguished from
market information, which encompasses "information about events or circumstances which
affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or
earning power." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 799 (1973). It has been argued that for
purposes of the disclosure requirements of rule lOb-5 the distinction is irrelevant, and that
market as well as inside information could be of material importance in investment decisions.
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and InformationalAdvantages Under the Federal Securities Laws,
93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 329 (1979).
8 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see also text accompanying notes 80-99. For an analysis of pre- and
post-Chiarellainsider trading, see Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:A
Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1982).
9 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
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ship, the Court left open the question of the liability under rule lOb-5
of a tippee, 10 an outsider who stands in no fiduciary relationship" to
the corporation or its shareholders. In Dirks v. Securities & Exchange
Commission,'2 the Court clarified when such a duty is properly im3
posed upon tippees of corporate insiders.1
In 1973, Raymond L. Dirks was a vice president of Delafield
Childs, a New York broker-dealer firm which derived most of its
business from serving institutional investors.14 Dirks' specialty was
advising these investors with regard to transactions in insurance company securities, and he had developed a reputation among investors
for being a particularly knowledgeable investment analyst.' 5 In
March of that year Dirks received information regarding Equity
Funding Corporation of America (EFCA)'6 from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of EFCA, who told Dirks that the corporation's assets
were "vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent corporate practices."1 7 Secrist provided Dirks with the names of present and former
EFCA employees who he claimed would substantiate his allegations.I 8
Dirks traveled to EFCA's corporate headquarters in Los Angeles,
California to investigate the charges, and spoke with Patrick Hopper,
who had once been the investments officer for an EFCA subsidiary.' 9
Although Hopper had no direct proof, he maintained that it was
common knowledge at EFCA that the company had been creating
fictitious insurance policies. 20 Hopper further charged that EFCA's
sales figures had been falsified. 2' Similar allegations were confirmed
10 The term tippee refers to someone with no relationship to the corporation who receives
inside information from a corporate insider, and who knows or has reason to know that the
information is nonpublic and intended only for corporate purposes. In re Investors Management
Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
11It is commonly recognized that directors, officers, and controlling shareholders of a
corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. See generally 3 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 838 (perm. ed. 1975). As such, they may not obtain any
"private advantage" by virtue of that position at the expense of the corporation or
its shareholders. Id.
12 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).

13 The traditional concept of an insider derives from § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(1982), which classifies as insiders directors, officers, and beneficial owners of 10 % of a corporation's equity securities.
" Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 828-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
15 Id. at 829.
Id. at 828. Equity Funding of America (EFCA) was a diversified corporation engaged in
selling life insurance and mutual funds. Id.
17 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
IS In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH)
82,812, 83,942 (Jan. 22,
1981), af'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
19 Id.

20 Id. Secrist's estimate was that there were 40,000 such "policies" accounting for at least

one-third of EFCA's total life insurance business in 1972. Id.
21 Id.
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by several other former EFCA employees, as well as by one present
employee.

22

Although neither Dirks nor Delafield Childs owned or traded any
EFCA stock, several of Dirks' institutional clients, with whom he
discussed his knowledge of fraudulent practices at EFCA, did engage
in trading of the company's stock. 23 One investor, for instance, sold all
of its shares in EFCA, worth over seven million dollars, and all of its
EFCA debentures, valued at $575,000.24 Similar transactions took
place involving other institutional investors contacted by Dirks, as
well as investment advisors not among Dirks' regular clients who had
contacted Dirks in order to verify rumors concerning EFCA which
were then circulating in the investment community. 25 As a result of
Dirks' investigation and his communication with his clients, word of
Secrist's charges spread. Within a two week period, the price of EFCA
stock fell from twenty-six dollars to less than fifteen dollars per
share.

26

The New York Stock Exchange had been aware for several days
of the rumors of fraud at EFCA, 27 and, noticing the increased activity
in the trading of EFCA securities, on March 27, suspended such
trading. 2 Shortly thereafter California insurance authorities examined EFCA's records and discovered evidence of fraud. 29 On April 2,
the SEC filed a complaint against EFCA, 30 and EFCA immediately
22 Id. at 83,942-43. Dirks also met with Frank Majerius, a former EFCA comptroller whose
name Secrist had supplied. Id. at 83,942. Majerius admitted that he personally had falsified
ledgers in 1970 "to conceal the fictitious nature of the insurance that was being carried on
EFCA's books." Id. On March 22, Dirks contacted Gene Thibodeau, who had been employed by
EFCA's computer department until October 1971. Id. at 83,943. He confirmed that fictitious
insurance policies created at EFCA were being reinsured by other companies. Dirks also spoke
with Peter Ronchetti and Brian Tickler, who had worked for EFCA, and Don Goff, who was
still employed by EFCA. Each substantiated the allegation that computer files at EFCA contained fabricated insurance policies. Id. Similarly, Dirks contacted William Blundell, the Wall
Street Journal's Los Angeles Bureau Chief, several times requesting that he write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell declined, fearing that publication of such "damaging hearsay might
be libelous." Dirks, 103 S.Ct. at 3258. Only after the SEC filed a complaint against EFCA did
Blundell publish an article on the fraud uncovered at EFCA, based mostly on information
received from Dirks. Id. at 3259.
23 See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 831 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
24 Id. The investor, Boston Company Institutional Investors, promised to direct $25,000 of
commissions through Delafield Childs. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258 n.2.
25 Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 831 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
26 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
21 In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,812, 83,944 (Jan. 22,
1981), alf'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
28 Id.
29 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258-59.
30 Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983). As early
as 1971 the SEC had heard allegations of fraud at EFCA. Id.at 832 n.6. On March 9, 1973, an
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31
went into receivership.
As the result of an SEC disciplinary hearing, an administrative
law judge found that Dirks had aided and abetted four of his institutional clients 32 in violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 33
In addition, the SEC found that Dirks himself had both violated and
aided and abetted violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule
lOb-5. 34 The judge censured the four clients and suspended Dirks from
associating with any registered broker or dealer for sixty days. 35 On
appeal, the SEC affirmed Dirks' aiding and abetting liability under

official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's Los Angeles division of
Secrist's charges of fraud. Id. On March 27, Dirks and several former EFCA employees presented
their information to the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles. Id. at 832.
31 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259. A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a
105-count indictment against 22 persons, among them EFCA officers and directors. Each was
found guilty on one or more counts. Id. at 3259 n.4.
12 Boston Co. Inst'l Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,705, 80,865-66 (Sept. 1, 1978), afj'd sub nom. In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,812 (Jan. 22, 1981), alf'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct.
3255 (1983). Those joined in the hearing were: Boston Co. Institutional Investors, Inc.; the
Dreyfus Corporation; Tomlin, Zimmerman and Parmlee; Manning and Napier; and John W.
Bristol and Company. Id. at 80,819-23, 80,834.
33 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act encompass the general antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. Section 17(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
14 Boston Co. Inst'l Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH)
81,705, 80,865-66 (Sept. 1, 1978), afJ'd sub nom. In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,812 (Jan. 22, 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct.
3255 (1983). The presently recognized three-part test for an analysis of aiding and abetting
liability under the securities laws was established in Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d
168, 178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). This test sets out that the accused is
guilty of aiding and abetting where "1) another party has committed a securities law violation;
2) the accused aider and abetter had a general awareness that his role was part of an overall
activity that was improper; and 3) the accused aider and abetter knowingly and substantially
assisted the principal violation." Id. The circuit court in Dirks read the test of Investors Research
in conjunction with the reasoning of Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975),
and on this basis confirmed Dirks' liability as an aider and abetter of his clients' 10b-5 violations.
See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-46 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); see also
Woodward, 522 F.2d at 94.
31 Boston Co. Inst'l Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,705, 80,867 (Sept. 1, 1978), af'd sub nom. In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
RE. (CCH) 82,812, 83,590 (Jan. 22, 1981), afj'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 3255 (1983).
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section 17(a), section 10(b), and rule 10b-5. 36 Recognizing, however,
that Dirks had "played an important role in bringing EFCA's massive
37
fraud to light," the SEC reduced his sanction to censure.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Dirks' liability for aiding and abetting violations of rule 10b5. 38 Writing for the majority, Judge Skelly Wright found that "the
obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they
disclose their [material inside] information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 39 Thus, the court concluded that Dirks
had a duty either to make a general disclosure of his knowledge about
EFCA "or to refrain from trading (or fostering trades) in Equity
Funding securities." 40
In reversing the appeals court decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the 10b-5 duty of disclosure did not serve to

In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fmn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, 83,590 (Jan. 22,
1982), a-'d, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). In both his initial
disciplinary hearing and the appeal that followed, Dirks challenged his liability under rule lOb5, claiming that there could be no finding of liability because the information he transmitted was
not material. Id. at 83,945-46. Dirks argued that the information comprised "merely rumors and
unverified allegations." Id. at 83,946. Both the administrative law judge and the SEC, however,
concluded that the corroboration of fraud charges at EFCA which Dirks obtained via his
investigation raised the rumors to a level of what could reasonably be seen as material information. Id. Further, in his defense Dirks alleged that the information he transmitted was not inside
information, because it was obtained from only mid-level executives at EFCA, and the uppermost management had denied the allegations. Id. at 83,948. The information Dirks uncovered
and communicated during his investigation was found to be inside information at the conclusion
of both hearings, based on the fact that Dirks, in light of his experience in investment counseling,
knew or should have known that those who became aware of the information would trade in the
affected securities. Id. The final prerequisite to a finding of liability under rule lOb-5 which
Dirks alleged to be absent under the facts of his case was scienter. Id. at 83,949; see Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (proscriptions of rule lob-5 apply only to intentional
conduct); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (rule lob-5 proscribes only "knowing and
intentional" misconduct). Both proceedings at the administrative level, however, concluded that
Dirks' actions were performed with intent sufficient to trigger rule 10b-5 liability. Boston Co.
Inst'l Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,705, 80,860-65 (Sept.
1, 1978), aff'd sub nom. In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REs. (CCH) 82,812
(Jan. 22, 1981), af'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); In re Dirks,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fmn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, 83,949 (Jan. 22, 1981), aff'd, 681
F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
Dirks raised each of the above defenses in his appeal before the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 842-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct.
3255 (1983). Based on reasoning substantially consistent with that of the SEC's two prior
decisions, the circuit court held Dirks liable. The Supreme Court did not discuss the above
defenses and they therefore will not be discussed further in this Note.
37 In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, 83,950-51 (Jan. 22,
1981), afJ'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
38 Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
19 Id. at 839.
o Id. at 837.
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limit Dirks' usage of the information he had received. 4' The Court
determined that an affirmative duty of disclosure should be imposed
on tippees only when they knowingly receive material inside information through a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by their informant
to the shareholders of the subject corporation. 42 The Court concluded
that the test for determining when a breach exists in cases involving an
insider's disclosure to a tippee is whether or not the insider "receives a
direct or indirect personal benefit from his disclosure."' 43 Since the
court did not find that Dirks' informants received any such benefit,
Dirks was not held to a duty either44 to disclose the information he
received or to abstain from trading.
The prohibition against insider trading is a judicial and administrative derivation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. 45 The SEC first imposed an explicit ban on insider trading in
1942 with its promulgation of rule lOb-5, 46 the first violation of which
occurred the following year, in In re Ward La France Truck Co. 47 In
that case, the officers, directors, and controlling shareholders of a
41 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3268.
12

Id. at 3264.

41 Id. at 3266.
44Id. at 3268.
45 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and § 10b and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act comprise the

antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In Dirks the Supreme Court limited its analysis
to Dirks' liability under rule 10b-5, "the most inclusive of the three provisions on which the SEC
rested its decision." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3260 n.ll. Therefore this Note, when referring to the
antifraud provisions, will confine its analysis to rule 10b-5.
It is commonly recognized that the term fraud, as used in the Act, was not meant to be
limited to its common law connotations, but rather was intended to be construed more broadly
in order to make up for the deficiencies in the common law concept of actionable fraud. See,
e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963); see also Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L. REV. 227, 231-42
(1933).
4' Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942); 17 C.F.R. § 740.10b-5 (1949). Prior to
enactment of the federal securities laws, parties aggrieved by fraudulent securities transactions
were relegated to recovery under common law. See generally Comment, The Prospectsfor Rule
X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for DefraudedInvestors, 59 YALE L. REV. 1120 (1950). Under
common law there was no remedy for damages resulting from one party's failure to disclose in
the absence of an affirmative misrepresentation. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. Ch. 581 (N.Y.
1868). Prior to the 1933 and 1934 Acts, a minority of jurisdictions recognized a fiduciary
relationship and an affirmative duty of disclosure resulting therefrom in transactions between
corporate insiders and their shareholders. 3 L. Loss, SECURITiES REcULATIONS 1446 (2d ed. 1961).
The Supreme Court adopted an offshoot of this minority approach in 1909 in Strong v. Repide,
213 U.S. 419 (1909), wherein it was held that corporate insiders had an affirmative duty of
disclosure in transactions with shareholders under circumstances which rendered the insider's
failure to disclose fraudulent. Strong, 213 U.S. at 431-33.
" 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
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closely held corporation were held to have violated rule lOb-5 by
failing to disclose material facts regarding the condition of the corpo48
ration prior to purchasing stock from the minority shareholders.
Early judicial encounters with rule 10b-5 produced similar
results. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,4° a federal district court
held that "[u]nder any reasonably liberal construction," section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 apply "to directors and officers who, in purchasing the
stock of [a] corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact coming to
their knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially
affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction." 5 0 Although
these early interpretations of rule 10b-5 clearly established that corporate insiders5 ' were subject to its limitations, neither the courts nor the
SEC ever defined the outer bounds of liability under the rule. Thus,
these early decisions failed to provide a theory of liability which
would encompass the fraudulent conduct of those persons outside the
realm of traditional corporate insiders., 2
It was not until 1961 that the SEC took the first step toward
providing guidelines for defining those persons falling within the
scope of rule lOb-5. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 5 3 the SEC brought
an administrative action against a registered representative of a broker-dealer who received information from a corporate insider regarding the corporation's planned dividend reduction.5 4 The representative traded in these securities of the corporation, utilizing the
55
information he had received before this information became public.
Id. at 381.
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
-oId. at 800.
51 Early cases restricted the application of rule 10b-5 to traditional corporate insiders as
defined by § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1982). Section 16(b) defines insiders as
directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than 10% of any class of equity security
registered under the Act. Its purpose is to prevent "unfair use of information obtained by virtue
of such insider's relationship to the corporation by requiring them to disgorge profits made on a
purchase and sale or sale and purchase of securities transacted within six months"; such short
swing transactions are presumptively carried out on the basis of inside information. See Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
52 The language of rule lOb-5 extends its prohibitions to "any person." See supra note 5 for
text of rule. Until 1961, however, the scope of liability under the rule was restricted to corporate
insiders. This restriction arguably was unwarranted based on the presence of § 16(b) in the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1982), which restricts the activities of insiders with regard to transactions
in the securities of their corporations. See supra note 51. It can be implied that rule 10b-5 was
intended to reach a more expansive scope of fraudulent activity than that encompassed by §
16(b). Comment, A New Concept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange-A Comment On In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 5 S.C.L. REV. 557, 565-66 (1963).
s 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
s' Id. at 908-09.
1
4

55

Id.

1984]

NOTES

The SEC found that rule 10b-5 applies to "any person" involved in a
securities transaction, and rejected the representative's contention
that his conduct was not within the ambit of the rule because he was
not a traditional insider. 56 The Commission thus reaffirmed its position that rule 10b-5 required corporate insiders, by virtue of their
position in the corporation, to reveal material facts to which they are
privy and which they could foresee would affect the judgment of those
with whom they are dealing.57 The SEC concluded that failure to
disclose under these circumstances would be a violation of the antifraud provisions. 5 It further held that when disclosure is not possible,
the insider must abstain from trading on the information, 59 thus creat60
ing what became known as the "duty to disclose or abstain."
While the SEC in Cady, Roberts established a duty to disclose or
abstain for corporate insiders, it adopted a flexible interpretation of
"insider." The SEC reasoned that the duty to disclose or abstain is
triggered by two factors: (1) a person's relationship to the corporation
which gives him access to inside information, and (2) the need to
prevent his use of the information to the disadvantage of those with
whom he deals.6 ' Liability under the antifraud provisions, premised
upon a duty to disclose or abstain, was to be imposed not on the basis
of "rigid classifications," but rather by identifying those persons "who
are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal
affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities." 6 2 In Cady, Roberts, the SEC concluded that the defendant was
subject to the same duties as the insider from whom he had received
the information, and was therefore liable for a failure to disclose or
abstain 63

Id. at 911.
" Id. The SEC's position was consistent with judicial interpretation of rule 10b-5. See Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), and Kardon, 73 F. Supp at 800.
11 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
59

Id.

60 The disclose or abstain rule has been called the "essence of rule lOb-5. SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
01 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. The Commission stated:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose or abstain] rests on two principal elements:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.
Id.
62 Id.
63

Id.
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Although the application of the disclose or abstain doctrine became the threshold inquiry in subsequent rule 10b-5 analyses, a split
developed regarding what circumstances triggered the duty. While
some courts concluded that the duty to disclose or abstain arose only
out of a fiduciary relationship between the two parties to a transaction,6 4 most courts, as well as the Commission, read Cady, Roberts as
authorizing liability under rule 10b-5 on the basis of mere possession
5
of inside information.1
The broadest interpretation of the scope of rule lOb-5 occurred in
1968 with the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.66 In that case the court
adopted the disclose or abstain doctrine of Cady, Roberts 7 and extended its application to "anyone in possession of material inside
information."6 " Such an expansive interpretation, the court reasoned,
was justified because the policy basis for rule 10b-5 is a "justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information." 6 9 The majority of courts and the SEC reasoned that this

64 Subsequent to the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts, some courts remained reluctant
to
impose a duty of disclosure under rule lOb-5 absent some fiduciary relationship between the
parties to a transaction. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968)
(to read rule lOb-5 as imposing duty to disclose on those other than insiders would require "most
careful consideration"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 290 (1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus.,
Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1967) (no obligation to disclose without insider status or fiduciary
relationship), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963) (§ 10(b) creates fiduciary relationship between insiders with whom they deal).
65 See, e.g., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 979 (1969) (rule 10b-5 based on policy that investors
have equal access to information and implements Congress' purpose that all investors should
have equal access to rewards of trading); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (rule lOb-5 based on justifiable expectation of securities marketplace that all investors
"have relatively equal access to material information"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); In re
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968) (selective disclosure by
broker-dealer of inside information available only for corporate purpose and inherent unfairness
of taking advantage of such information). But see Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund,
Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no duty to disclose information available to purchasers
where purchasers failed to uncover information on their own); Klamber v. Roth, 473 F. Supp.
544 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no duty to disclose information to one who reasonably should already be
aware of it).
66 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
61 Id. at 848.
68 Id.
69 Id. But see SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 920 (1969) (refusing to impose affirmative duty of disclosure on persons not in special
relationship to buyer or seller of securities); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d
159 (2d. Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
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formulation, the "equal access to information" theory, was the only
adequate method of enforcing the protections of the securities
laws. 70
The trend toward liberal application of liability under rule lOb-5
soon led both the courts and the SEC to find that the rule encompassed tippees as well as corporate insiders. 71 In Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc.,72 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found support in its Texas Gulf Sulphur decision
for the conclusion that tippees who held no confidential relationship
to the corporation or its shareholders could be held to a duty to
disclose or abstain.7 3 The court noted its prior observation that the
conduct of tippees who traded on inside information and similar
conduct by insiders could be "equally reprehensible," and went on to
hold that all defendants, including both insiders and tippees, were
liable for their failure to publicly disclose material inside information
before trading. 74 Similarly, in In re Investors Management Co.,
Inc. ,'7 the SEC, relying on Cady, Roberts, held tippees subject to a
duty to disclose or abstain where: (1) the information received is
material and nonpublic; (2) the tippee knew or should have known
that it was obtained improperly; and (3) the information was a factor
in the tippee's decision to buy or sell securities. 76 In adopting this
theory of tippee liability, the Commission explicitly rejected the notion that liability was precluded by the absence of a "special relationship" between the tippee and the issuer corporation or the insider
7
informant .
70
71

See Brudney, supra note 7, at 333-35.
See, e.g., Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972)

("[T]he essential purpose of Rule lOb-5 .. . is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees
from taking unfair advantage of uninformed outsiders."); Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 85253 (act of trading on undisclosed information would be "equally reprehensible"), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (tippees subject to
same duty as insiders when they act with actual or constructive knowledge that the information
they receive is undisclosed).
72 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1968). In Shapiro, five purchasers of stock instituted a class action
against Merrill Lynch and Merrill Lynch's tippees in order to recover under rule lob-5. Id. at
232-33. Douglas Aircraft Corporation hired Merrill Lynch as the underwriter for a large issue of
debentures. Id. at 231. During the course of its work as an underwriter for Douglas, Merrill
Lynch learned that Douglas' earnings had taken a sharp drop from what had been anticipated by
the corporation. Before this information became public Merrill Lynch informed some of its
clients, who then sold their stock. The uninformed purchasers later filed suit, and Merrill Lynch
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Id. at 232-33. The district court denied the motion and the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 242.
11 Id. at 237.
74 Id. at 237-38 (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852-53).
7s 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
76 Id. at 641.
1 Id. at 643.

726

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:715

In Chiarella v. United States,7 8 a sharply divided United States
Supreme Court rejected the equal access to information theory. In
reversing the Second Circuit, the Court found that the duty to disclose
or abstain was a derivative of the fiduciary relationship between the
parties to a transaction.79 Writing the plurality opinion, Justice Powell
reasoned that affirming liability on the basis of the equal access to
information theory would mean "recognizing a general duty between
all participants in market transactions to forego actions based on
material, nonpublic information."80 Such a broad obligation, the
Court held, was both contrary to congressional intent 8' and a depar78 445 U.S. 222 (1980). During the course of his employment with Pandick Press, a financial
printer, Chiarella uncovered information regarding corporate takeover bids. He purchased stock
in the target corporations and later sold his shares at a profit after the bids were publicly
announced. Id. at 224. Chiarella was convicted of a criminal violation of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 558 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Based on the belief that the federal securities laws are intended to
preserve equal access to information among investors, the Second Circuit affirmed Chiarella's
conviction. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). The appeals court reasoned that his access to material nonpublic information imposed
upon Chiarella a duty to disclose or abstain. Id. In addition, the court held that Chiarella's
misappropriation of the information on which he traded also formed a basis for his liability
under the rule. Id. at 1367-68 & n. 14 ("[i]n clear violation of his duties as an agent, he converted
to his personal use confidential information entrusted to him in the course of his employment"
(citations omitted)).
The United States Attorney prosecuting Chiarella before the Supreme Court argued the
misappropriation theory, arguing that Chiarella's conversion of nonpublic corporate information
for his personal benefit had operated as a fraud upon both the acquiring corporation and the
sellers. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36. The Court did not address Chiarella's liability under this
theory, however, because it had not been presented to the jury. Id. at 236. Rather, it focused
upon the appeals court's holding regarding Chiarella's status as an insider and his attendant duty
to disclose or abstain.
79 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. The Chiarella Court noted that the Second Circuit's
preChiarella holding in General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), had recognized no § 10(b) violation where a tender offeror
made preannouncement purchases because there was no relationship between the offeror and the
seller. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32 n.14. (citing General Time Corp., 463 F.2d at 164). In its
Chiarellaopinion the appeals court had distinguished its decision in General Time by holding
that the theory of liability which excused the defendants in that case was inapplicable to the facts
of Chiarella because Chiarella "was not a 'tippee' of [his employer's] clients, with liability
derivative only through them." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1367 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Rather, he was liable under rule lOb-5 because he "converted to his
personal use confidential information entrusted to him in the course of his employment." Id. at
1367-68. By declining to discuss the misappropriation theory of liability, the Supreme Court did
not address the holding of General Time in the same context as the lower court, and therefore
found it contradictory that the same court could have required a fiduciary relationship to give
rise to lob-5 liability in one case and thereafter find liability, as in Chiarella, in the absence of
such a relationship. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
80 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
11 Id. The Court concluded that to impose liability pursuant to a parity of information
theory would exceed the scope of the liability intended by Congress. To support this argument
the Court relied upon the fact that several classes of market professionals are exempt from the
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ture from the established principle that an affirmative duty of disclo82
sure arises only "from a specific relationship between two parties."
The Chiarella majority recognized that section 10(b) is properly
viewed as a catch-all provision designed to prevent fraud, but stressed
that "what it catches must be fraud. 8' 3 Justice Powell pointed out
that, unless there is a duty to speak, silence does not constitute fraudulent nondisclosure.8 4 Therefore, the Court concluded that the duty to
disclose or abstain does not arise from the mere possession of material,
of trust and
nonpublic information, but rather from a relationship
85
confidence between the parties to a transaction.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger addressed the misappropriation theory of liability left open by the majority.8" He concluded that both section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 support a finding that
anyone "who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an ab-

requirements of various antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. Id. As an example, the Court cited
§ 11, which "generally forbids a member of a national securities exchange from effecting any
transaction on the exchange for its own account." Id. at 233 n. 16 (referring to § 11 of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1-5) (1976)). The Court expressed the view that the exemption of
broker-dealers was indicative of Congress' general recognition that "specialists contribute to a
fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that
comes from their possession of buy and sell orders." Id. at 233-34 n.16 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-80). Thus, the duty to disclose or abstain for mere possession of material,
inside information, which follows from the equal access to information approach to liability
under rule 10b-5, places undue restrictions on market professionals and thereby undermines the
congressional goal of promoting the effective functioning of the securities markets.
12 Id. at 233. The Court relied on common law principles to support its holding that a duty
to disclose arises from a "fiduciary or other similar relation[ship] of trust and confidence"
between two parties. Id. at 228 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 551(2)(a) (1976)). In
addition, the Court placed emphasis on the SEC's holding in Cady, Roberts that such a
relationship exists "between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation." Id. at 228.
Although the Court failed to identify other situations where parties stand in a fiduciary relationship which would give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain, it did recognize that in Cady, Roberts,
the SEC had held that a fiduciary relationship will arise between an insider and a purchaser,
where the purchaser is not already a shareholder. Id. at 227 n.8 (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C.
at 912 n.23 (quoting Gratz v. Galughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951)).
s1Id. at 235.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 227-28, 235. Because Chiarella had no such relationship with the sellers of the
securities in which he had traded, his conviction was reversed. Id. at 232, 236. The Court stated:
No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target
company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not
their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt
with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
Id. at 232-33.
86 Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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solute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. '8 7
The dissent reasoned that liability thus arises when someone trades on
undisclosed information which was procured "not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means." 8 8 The
Chief Justice found support for this conclusion both in the history of
the statute89 and in Cady, Roberts, his reading of which stressed that
access to, and subsequent use of, information not available to others is
inherently unfair. 90
In addition to sidestepping the misappropriation theory of liability, the Chiarellaplurality did not define the extent to which corporate outsiders, such as tippees, were restricted by the prohibitions of
rule 10b-5. As one outside the realm of traditional corporate insiders
has no preexisting fiduciary relationship either to the corporation or to
its shareholders with whom he trades, 9' application of the Chiarella
formulation would seem to preclude tippee liability. In a revealing
footnote, however, the Court acknowledged the propriety of tippee
liability and noted that tippees "have a duty not to profit from the use
of inside information that they know is confidential and know or
should know came from a corporate insider." 9 2 Thus, the Chiarella
Court explained that the liability of tippees arises from their role "as
[participants] after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty." 93
Two years later, in Dirks v. SEC,9 4 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld the censure of Dirks for his violations of
rule 10b-5. 95 The court read Shapiro"8 and Investors Management9 7 as
imposing the obligations of corporate fiduciaries on all tippees to
87

Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

88

Id.

Id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger found support for his position in
the legislative purpose behind the securities laws insofar as they guarantee fair dealings in
securities transactions without special benefits to any one investor.
80 Id. (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912).
81 See 6 L. Loss, SEcuRITIFs REGULATIONS 3561 (2d ed. 1961); see also supra note 10.
92 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
81

93

Id.

681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
95 Id. at 846.
96 Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 228; see supra text accompanying notes 72-74. It is significant to note
that the court's reasoning in Shapiro, although based on an equal access to information theory,
recognized liability on the part of the tippees because they "knew or should have known of the
confidential corporate source" of the information disclosed to them. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 238. It
was this language which contributed to the Supreme Court's conception in Chiarellaof tippees as
"[participants] after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
230 n.12.
87 Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 633; see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
84
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whom the fiduciaries reveal inside information before it has been
made public. 8 Judge Wright, who authored the court of appeals
opinion, examined the allusion to tippee liability in Justice Powell's
9 and concluded that the breach of an insider's
footnote in Chiarella"
fiduciary duty was not a prerequisite to imposing a duty to disclose or
abstain on a tippee. 100 Because the appeals court concluded that Dirks'
informants would have been prevented by rule lOb-5 from trading on
the information they provided to Dirks, the court subjected Dirks and
his clients to the same restrictions. ' 0' Although Judge Wright did not
recognize a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Dirks' informants,102 he concluded that Dirks was liable for disseminating information selectively, and thus initiating trading which would have been
prohibited conduct for his informants. 0 3 In essence, the court of
appeals found that Dirks' actions amounted to a constructive breach
of the fiduciary duty owed by his informants to the shareholders of
104
EFCA.

98 Dirks, 681 F.2d at 839.
9 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
100 Dirks, 681 F.2d at 838 & n.16. The court stated:
We do not think that the Supreme Court [in Chiarella]meant [footnote 12] to imply
that application of the Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch doctrine requires breach of fiduciary duty even if breach is not required to make the insiders themselves liable. Nor do
we think it means that breach by insiders is necessary to make their "tippees"
answerable for acts that would have constituted a breach had they been committed
by the insiders.
Id. at 839 n.16.
101 Id.
102 Id.

at 839.
at 838.

101 Id. at 839.

Id. Although the circuit court did not explicitly label Dirks' conduct as a constructive
breach, commentators have attached this label to the court's theory of liability, which expressly
rejects the need for an informant's breach of fiduciary duty in his disclosure as a prerequisite to
imposing a duty to disclose or abstain on the tippee. See Note, Whistle Blowing As A Rule 10b-5
Violation: Dirks v. SEC, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 987, 999 (1982). The constructive breach theory
relies on the equal access to information approach to liability under rule lOb-5. Id. at 999. The
theory holds that a tippee constructively breaches the fiduciary duty of his informant by failing
to uphold the duty to disclose or abstain incumbent on him because of his receipt of material,
inside information from the informant. Id. at 1000. The duty to disclose or abstain is imposed on
the tippee to prevent the inherent unfairness of informational advantages. Id. The constructive
breach theory was weak in light of Chiarella;the District of Columbia Circuit in Dirks was the
only court to uphold the theory.
As an alternative theory of liability, the court held that Dirks had violated a duty to disclose
or abstain which he owed to the SEC and the public, by virtue of his status as a registered
broker-dealer. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 840. The court found this duty to be consistent with the
extensive regulations in the 1934 Act specifically addressing the conduct of broker-dealers. The
court substantiated these requirements and the duty resulting therefrom on the basis that
"broker-dealers were required to meet a high standard of ethical behavior in their activities."
Id.
104
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° rejected the appeals court's analyThe Supreme Court in Dirks'"
sis, maintaining that it was based on a theory of 10b-5 liability which
was incongruent with the reasoning espoused by the Court in
Chiarella.0 6 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that both
the SEC and the court of appeals had found Dirks liable on the theory
that "the antifraud provisions require equal information among all
traders." 107 This equal information theory, the Court reasoned, would
extend liability beyond the scope intended by Congress. 0 8 Accordingly, the Dirks Court reaffirmed Chiarella, holding that a duty to
disclose or abstain arises not on mere receipt of material inside information, but "from the relationship between [two] parties."1 09
Having found the relationship between the parties to be the
central issue, the Court set out to determine when a duty to disclose or
abstain should be imposed on a tippee in Dirks' position." 0 Relying on
its interpretation of Investors Management, the majority concluded
that "some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders
not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has
been made available to them improperly.""' The insider's disclosure
would be "improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty."" 2 Thus, a tippee assumes an insider's duty to disclose or abstain only when the insider from whom the tippee receives his information has breached a fiduciary duty, and the tippee has either actual
3
or constructive knowledge of such breach."

105 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3255.
016Id. at 3265.
107 Id. The majority consisted of Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, White, Burger, and
Stevens. Dissenting were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall.
108 Id. at 3262 n.16.
'0o Id. at 3263 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 n.14).
110 Id. at 3263-66.
'I Id. at 3264 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court noted that the SEC itself
had identified this element of tippee liability when it stated in Investors Management that tippee
liability is partially based on a tippee's knowledge that the information he receives has been
obtained improperly. Id. at 3264 n.19 (quoting Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 651).

12 Id.
13 Id.; accord SEC v. Musella, No. 83 Civ. 342 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1984) (inference that
sophisticated investor could have known, without direct knowledge, that information received
originated improperly from insider). But see SEC v. Platt, 565 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Okla. 1983)
(vague generalities regarding intended purchases do not result in inference that recipient knew
information was confidential or that it came from corporate insider); SEC v. Materia, FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,526 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1983) (wife unschooled in market analysis following
advice of husband does not act with requisite scienter regarding source of information when

trading on it). See 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAuD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, §§

7.5(3)(e)-(6)(c) (1982) for a pre-Dirks discussion of tippee liability which, although compiled
during the use of the equal access to information approach to the rule, contemplates liability for
tippees consistent with a Dirks approach.
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The Dirks Court then determined what constitutes a breach of an
insider's fiduciary duty. Relying on the SEC's interpretation of the
securities laws as stated in Cady, Roberts," 4 the Court held that the
test for determining whether an insider has breached his fiduciary
duty owed to the stockholders of the corporation is "whether [he]
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." " 5
The majority indicated that the existence of personal gain may be
evidenced by a pecuniary or reputational benefit to the insider, but
also explicitly recognized that a gift of inside information to a tippee
would constitute a breach of the donor's duty."" Concluding that
Dirks' informants had received no personal gain, the Court found no
these informants, and therefore
primary breach of fiduciary duty by
"no derivative breach by Dirks." 7
In a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Marshall, apparently accepted the theory of tippee
liability formulated by the majority, but disagreed that personal gain
was a proper indicator of a breach of an insider's fiduciary duty.",
Justice Blackmun took the position that the insider owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation's shareholders which is breached whenever his
misuse of nonpublic information causes them losses." 9 Whether the
insider acted with a motive of personal gain or realized any personal
benefit, Justice Blackmun asserted, should play no part in determining whether that duty has been breached. 2 0 Justice Blackmun argued,
in effect, that an absolute duty to disclose or abstain should be im2
posed on all recipients of disclosures which injure the shareholders. ' '

114 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265. The Court accepted the Cady, Roberts interpretation that one
purpose of the securities laws was to "eliminate [the] 'use of inside information for personal
advantage.' " Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15).
I" Id. at 3265.
116 Id. at 3266. A gift of inside information to a relative or friend, followed by a trade, the
Court reasoned, is closely analogous to the insider trading on the information himself, and
making a subsequent gift of ill-gotten gains. Id.
17 Id. at 3267-68. The Court concluded that Secrist and Dirks' other tippers "received no
monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks." Id.
-18See id.at 3270 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"o Id. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Id.
121Id. The dissent would find the breach of an insider's fiduciary duty when the insider's
120

actions injure shareholders and when they are performed with the requisite scienter. Id. Under
this formulation, tippees would not assume an insider's duty to disclose or abstain unless the
insider's disclosure was made with the intent that "the inside information be used for trading
purposes to the disadvantage of the shareholders." Id. at 3271 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The dissent reasoned that the Cady, Roberts duty of insiders is owed2
directly to shareholders, and therefore should inure to their benefit.12
The Dirks Court's pronouncement of tippee liability is a logical
extension of the Court's Chiarellareasoning. In Chiarellathe majority
rejected the equal access to information theory of liability under rule
10b-5, and conditioned an insider's duty to disclose or abstain on the
existence of a fiduciary relationship. 2 3 By definition, this theory excludes outsiders such as tippees who do not stand in a fiduciary
relationship either to the corporation to whose information they are
exposed or to its shareholders. The ChiarellaCourt, however, recognized the existence of tippee liability, but recognized a duty of disclosure only in those tippees who knowingly participate in an insider's
selective dissemination of inside information in breach of the insider's
fiduciary duties. 124 The Dirks Court explicitly adopted this formulation of tippee liability,125 and clarified it by defining what constitutes
12 6
a disclosure by an insider sufficient to breach his fiduciary duty.
Prior to Dirks, an insider's breach of fiduciary duty owed to his
corporation and its shareholders was not a relevant factor in determining liability under rule lOb-5. The issue of whether an insider has
breached his fiduciary duty arises primarily in conflict of interest
cases, in which insiders have allegedly engaged in self-dealing on
inside information for personal gain at the expense of the corporation's
shareholders. 2 7 Conflict of interest has traditionally been considered
to be an aspect of internal corporate mismanagement, which is governed by the law of the state of incorporation. 128 Absent an intent to
defraud, breaches of fiduciary duty were held insufficient to trigger
rule lOb-5 liability. 29 Consequently, the Supreme Court never de122 See id. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

See supra text accompanying notes 78-93.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230 n.12, 232-35.
125 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
123
124

126 Id. at 3265.
17 See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 113, at § 4.7 (000)-(120). See generally
Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 Tex. L. REV. 1247 (1983).
128 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (" 'Congress by § 10(b)
did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement.' " (quoting Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970) (allegations of mismanagement and
breach of fiduciary duty owed to corporation and its shareholders are not claims falling within
ambit of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (duty allegedly
breached is general duty and not actionable unless facts disclosed amount to deception); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (rule 10b-5 is directed solely at fraud
committed in purchase or sale of securities, not at corporate mismanagement), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952); see also A. BROMBERG & L. LowENFELS, supra note 113, at § 4.7 (513)-(547).
119See Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 473-74 (breach of fiduciary duty is actionable under
lob-5 only where conduct alleged is manipulative or deceptive); See generally Note, Suits For
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fined what constituted a breach of an insider's fiduciary duty because
30
to do so would federalize an inherently state law cause of action.1
Dirks established the disclosure of inside information through the
breach of an insider's fiduciary duty as the critical prerequisite for
imposing on tippees the rule lOb-5 duty to disclose or abstain.' 13 In
determining what constitutes such a breach, the Court focused on the
purpose of the disclosure and relied directly on the language of Cady,
Roberts, which stated that one objective of the securities laws is to
32
eliminate the "'use of inside information for personal advantage." 1
The Court developed its test for improper disclosure on the basis of
this objective. 133 Specifically, the Dirks majority reasoned that the
insider's improper purpose manifests itself when he derives some personal gain. Further, only where the tippee sought such gain and had
actual or constructive knowledge that the insider's disclosure
amounted to a breach of his fiduciary duty would he assume the
1 34
insider's lOb-5 obligation to disclose or abstain.
Although Justice Blackmun read the majority's personal gain
requirement as a subjective limitation on an insider's fiduciary duty,
and feared its potential for condoning abuse of inside information at
the expense of the shareholders, the majority took steps to ensure that
its formulation would not unduly restrict the scope of tippee liability.
First, the Court articulated a broad conception of what constitutes
evidence of a "personal gain. '1 35 Second, it restricted the class of
persons whose liability is derived from a breach of an informant's
fiduciary duties by broadening the definition of "insider" to include
those persons previously labelled "tippees." 136
In focusing on the purpose of the insider's disclosure of inside
information, the Dirks Court articulated a broad conception of what
constitutes an improper personal gain sufficient to breach the insider's
fiduciary duty and impute liability to his tippee. A finding of personal
gain, the Court held, must be based on objective criteria including,
1 37
but not limited to, evidence of direct financial gain to the insider.
Thus, any indirect personal benefit resulting from the disclosure
Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under Rule lOb-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1874 (1978); Comment, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green Revisited: A Critique Of
Circuit Court Application of Rule lOb-5 to Breaches of FiduciaryDuty to Minority Shareholders,
28 UCLA L. REV. 564 (1981).
o See Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 478-79.
"'
Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
132 Id. at 3265 (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15).
133Id.
131Id. at 3264.
135 See infra text accompanying notes 138-46.
131 See infra text accompanying notes 147-53.
137 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
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would qualify as an improper personal gain, as would any reputational benefit "that [would] translate into future earnings to the insider." 138 The Court also included as personal gains disclosures
wherein the insider intends to benefit the tippee by a gift of valuable
information.139 Exchanges of information between an insider and a
relative or friend would also fall within this category.140 The Court's
expansive definition of improper gain effectively proscribes insiders'
disclosures made with donative intent under the theory that the gift of
profits to the tippee is analogous to a gain derived from the direct
41
trading of the insider.
The Dirks personal gain test is consistent with the pre-Dirks
imposition of liability on tippees who engage in transactions from
which their insider informants would have been barred.142 Rather
than redefining the underlying rationale of tippee liability, the Court
has continued to recognize the need to impose on tippees sanctions for
improper conduct in order to prevent such outsiders from doing indirectly what rule 10b-5 prevents insiders from doing directly. 43 The
Court has accomplished this by restructuring the rationale of tippee
liability to conform to the framework of fiduciary relationships constructed in Chiarella. The majority appropriately recognized that the
appeals court's constructive breach theory of liability '44 was grounded
in the equal access to information principles renounced by Chiarella.
As a response, the Dirks Court adopted a derivative breach theory
which abides by Chiarella by premising liability on the breach of an
insider's fiduciary duty and the tippee's duty to disclose or abstain
which is derived from that breach. Seemingly, the only circumstance
wherein a tippee might escape liability for his use of inside information is in a fact situation similar to Dirks. Where there is a good faith
effort to abide by the antifraud provisions and an absence of improper
motivation behind the initial disclosure, a tippee in Dirks' position is
free from the constraints of rule lOb-5. This limited freedom from
liability will have the effect of promoting the function of market

138
139
140
141

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

412
See, e.g., Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 235 ("the essential purpose of rule lOb-5 . . .is to prevent

corporate insiders and their tippees from taking unfair advantage of. . .uninformed outsiders"
(citing Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972)); Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833 (rule lOb-5 applicable to outsiders to prevent taking unfair advantage
of undisclosed inside information).
143 Dirks, 103 S.Ct. at 3263.
"' See supra note 104.
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analysts in the operation of the securities markets: 145 it will enhance
their ability to circulate information freely, thereby fostering sound
investment decisions. 146
As a second means of preventing undue limitation of the scope of
tippee liability, the Dirks Court, in footnote fourteen, recognized that
those persons who have regular access to inside information, although
not traditional corporate insiders, may be treated as insiders for purposes of rule lOb-5 liability. 47 This serves to impose on persons who
regularly receive legitimately disclosed information, including "underwriters, lawyers and accountants," 1 48 an insider's duty to disclose
or abstain. 49 This exception negates any inference that the theory of
liability applied to Dirks would permit abuse of legitimately disclosed
information. In fact, in the context of disclosures motivated by a
legitimate business purpose and revealed with the expectation that
they will be kept confidential, the personal gain test applicable to
tippees is overridden by the recipient's status as an insider. 150 In short,
footnote fourteen serves to enlarge the class of persons who owe a
primary rather than a derivative duty to disclose or abstain.15 '
In order to construct this enlarged class of insiders, the Court
articulated a new source of fiduciary relationship and thereby (under
Chiarella) a means to directly impose the restrictions of rule 10b-5.
The majority expressly recognized that the source of this duty is a

145 The Court recognized the need to avoid overregulation of market professionals to
preserve
the effective functioning of the securities markets. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263 n.17. For a
discussion of the economic impact of the antifraud regulations on market efficiency, see H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
141 See Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus.
LAW. 517, 521-26 (1982).
'41 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
148 Id.
149 Id. By extending the class of insiders to encompass persons who receive inside
information
legitimately with the expectation that it be kept confidential, the Court has preserved decisions
such as Shapiro. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
In fact, Shapiro was decided on an equal access to information theory. See supra notes 72-74
and accompanying text. Under Dirks' footnote 14, however, the liability of the tippees can be
upheld on the basis that their working relationship with the corporation implied a duty of
confidentiality with regard to the information and imposed on them the rule lOb-5 restrictions of
an insider. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.

150 Id.
151 Absent footnote 14, recipients of legitimate disclosures of inside information would have
escaped liability as tippees under the Dirks rationale because of the absence of a motive of
personal gain in disclosures made to them. Footnote 14 serves to impose liability on recipients of
legitimate disclosures under the theory that persons in a position to receive such legitimate
disclosures are in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and as such are insiders for purposes
of rule lOb-5 liability.
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"special, confidential relationship"1 52 which provides access to legitimately disclosed inside information. As a result, the scope of footnote
fourteen prevents legitimate disclosures from escaping the requirements of rule lOb-5. Persons who otherwise would have been considered tippees and who would not have been liable because of the
legitimate nature of the disclosures made to them will now come
within the purview of rule lOb-5 under the theory that they are, in
153
effect, insiders.
The cumulative effect of the personal gain test and the extension
of the class of insiders is to make it unlikely that subsequent rule lOb-5
analyses will result in a more restrictive standard of liability. It may
be feared that Dirks will result in widespread tippee use of the legitimate disclosure defense to evade 10b-5 liability. Any such fear should
be allayed, however, by the Court's expansive definition of "personal
gain," which will severely restrict the scope of legitimate disclosures.
Moreover, legitimate disclosures of inside information which take
place in a business context will be subject, at least impliedly, to the
requirement that such information be kept confidential. 5 4 Once this
requirement is established, the recipient is deemed an insider under
footnote fourteen and therefore is subject to the obligation to disclose
or abstain irrespective of the motivation behind the disclosure. 55
Further, any tips by a footnote fourteen insider would violate his
obligation of confidentiality to the corporation, and therefore would
be improper. 56
A perplexing aspect of the Dirks decision is raised by the majority's statement that Dirks did not "misappropriate or illegally obtain
the information about Equity Funding." 51 7 The misappropriation theory of liability was first espoused by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent
in Chiarella,58 but has never been adopted by a majority of the

I" Dirks, 103

S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
151Id. For practical purposes, persons within this "special confidential relationship" include
anyone working for a corporation who is thereby privy to inside information and who is aware
that such information is intended "solely for corporate purposes." Id.; see SEC v. Musella, No.
83 Civ. 342 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1984).
11 Dirks, 103 S.Ct. at 3261 n. 14. The scope of the class of persons categorized as footnote 14
insiders hinges on whether the information is disclosed to the recipient with the expectation that
it be kept confidential. See SEC v. Musella, No. 83 Civ. 342 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1984). The Court
in Dirks stated that this expectation must at least be "implied" from the nature of the recipient's
relationship to the corporation. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
'5' Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
'5' See SEC v. Musella, No. 83 Civ. 342 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1984).
"5 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
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Court. Although one commentator has suggested that the misappropriation theory cannot survive the Dirks reasoning,1 59 the Court's use
of the term may be seen as an implicit recognition of the theory,
which already has been accepted as a viable approach to lOb-5 liability by the SEC and the federal courts.6 0
Seeking to comply with Chiarella, and wary of an extension of
liability which would have an adverse effect on the free functioning of
the market, the Court in Dirks sought to create a "guiding principle"11 for the resolution of tippee liability. The Court was presented
with the difficult task of applying a rule, the prohibitions of which are
triggered by the abuse of a fiduciary relationship, to those on whom
no preexisting fiduciary duties are imposed. The Court's reasoning
eases this inherent tension by articulating a method whereby tippees
may acquire the fiduciary obligations of their informants, and further, by recognizing that manipulation of the fiduciary relationship
concept is not necessary where the tippee may be categorized as an
insider. Absent congressional definition which removes outsider trading liability from the confines of judicial interpretation,1 62 the Dirks
reasoning is a consistent embodiment of the Supreme Court's interpretation of rule lOb-5 liability which began with Chiarella.

Karen Testa

'5
Block, Life After 'Dirks,' Can Outsider Trading Constitute Fraud?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19,
1983, at 15, col. 4; see Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266. It has been suggested that the misappropriation
theory of liability under rule 10b-5 has not survived the Dirks decision. This idea is based on the
recognition that Dirks is indicative of post-Chiarellaholdings which strictly adhere to Chiarella's
requirement of a fiduciary relationship prerequisite to imposing lob-5 liability.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
193 (1983); O'Conner & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); SEC v. Materia, Fmn. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,526 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1983).
161 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
162 Recent legislative efforts have been directed solely to insider trading under the rule. See

H.R. 559 entitled "The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983." The legislation is directed at
increasing present recovery for insider trading violations, and provides for treble civil penalties.
The legislation is sponsored by the SEC. See Block, Insider Trading Bill Raises Difficult Question, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1983, at 1, col. 1.

